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I. INTRODUCTION
Experiments with limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
through cap-and-trade programs are underway in approximately half
of U.S. states. There are currently three regional carbon markets
under development in the Northeast, the West and the Midwest, and
ten states recently joined eleven other countries and the European
Commission to form an international forum to share information and
experiences with the design and implementation of carbon markets.
At the same time, the U.S. Congress is considering multiple proposals
to create a federal cap-and-trade market.
Companies are beginning to take action to reduce their GHG
emissions, some voluntarily and some in preparation for
regional/state markets. The question arises whether and how a
federal carbon market should address the state and regional carbon
markets that are in operation before the federal market is
implemented. This topic is distinct from the broader issues of
defining the appropriate role for the states in a national GHG
emission reduction strategy or whether a federal law should preempt
states’ authority to limit GHG emissions within their borders. The
discussion in this article regarding preemption is limited to the
treatment of regional/state markets and does not address preemption
generally.
This article describes regional/state carbon market initiatives
currently under development, identifies alternatives for addressing
these initiatives within a federal GHG emissions cap-and-trade
system, and highlights political and administrative challenges
presented by each approach. To date, only one of the regional capCopyright © 2008 by Jonas Monast.
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and-trade markets – the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)
– is far enough along in its development to provide details with which
to compare to federal legislative proposals. As a result, RGGI is
cited where appropriate, but much of the discussion is framed in
general terms. The article also highlights related issues such as
integrating credits generated through offset projects (i.e. emissions
reductions or sequestration by uncapped entities such as small
emitters or the agricultural and forestry sectors) and providing credit
to companies that have taken early action to reduce GHG emissions.
II. REGIONAL/STATE CARBON
MARKETS CURRENTLY UNDER DEVELOPMENT
A growing number of regional/state carbon markets are currently
under development, each covering different segments of the economy
and imposing different emissions caps. Ten states in the Northeast
and Mid-Atlantic are cooperating in the development of the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) carbon market to cap emissions
from electric utilities, with emissions trading scheduled to begin in
1
2009. California has committed to a mandatory cap on emissions
2
from sources throughout the state’s economy through 2050, and
regulators are determining which mechanisms the state will use to
3
meet the targets. In 2007, Hawaii and New Jersey became the
second and third states to pass legislation mandating greenhouse gas
4
limits, committing to reductions through 2020 and 2050, respectively.
Like California, these states have not yet announced the mechanisms
they will use to achieve the reductions.
California is also working with six other states and two Canadian
provinces to develop the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), a
1. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, http://rggi.org/about.htm (last
visited Mar. 24, 2008).
2. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 38500-38599
(West Supp. 2007)).
3. California will release a draft Scoping Plan describing its GHG reduction strategies by
June 2008. California Environmental Protection Agency, Air Resources Board, AB 32 Scoping
Plan, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scopingplan.htm; see also California Environmental
Protection Agency, Climate Action Team Proposed Early Actions to Mitigate Climate Change
in California: Draft for Public Review 3, available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/
climate_action_team/reports/2007-04-20_CAT_REPORT.PDF.
4. Hawaii Global Warming Solutions Act of 2007, H.B. 226, 2007 Leg., 24th Sess. (Haw.
2007), signed into law June 30, 2007, available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/
sessioncurrent/bills/HB226_CD1_.htm; New Jersey Global Warming Response Act, Assemb.
3301, 2007 Leg., 212th Sess. (N.J. 2007), signed into law July 6, 2007, available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A3500/3301_R2.HTM.
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regional market similar to RGGI but with the goal of capping
5
emissions from a broader range of sources. On November 14, 2007,
governors from six Midwestern states and the premier of Manitoba
signed the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord to begin development of
6
their own regional carbon market. Three additional Midwestern
7
states signed onto the Accord as observers.
In addition to these formal market efforts, ten states
participating in the WCI or RGGI recently joined eleven other
countries and the European Commission in launching the
International Carbon Action Partnership, “an international forum of
governments and public authorities that are engaged in the process of
8
designing or implementing carbon markets.”
III. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
At least seven bills capping GHG emissions have been
9
introduced in the U.S. Senate this legislative session, and at least five
10
The
have been introduced in the House of Representatives.
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, introduced by Senators
Lieberman and Warner (the Lieberman-Warner bill), passed the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works December 5,
11
2005. Another bill, introduced by Senators Bingaman and Specter,
enjoys the support of a powerful array of stakeholders and has
12
garnered significant attention and support.
These bills do not directly address state markets, although the
Lieberman-Warner bill does authorize states to enact GHG
13
restrictions at least as stringent as those in the federal bill. This
5. See Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/.
6. See Midwestern Governors Association, Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord,
available at http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/resolutions/GHGAccord.pdf; see also
Midwestern Governors Association, Governors Sign Energy Security and Climate Stewardship
Platform and Greenhouse Gas Accord, http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/govenergynov.htm.
7. Id.
8. International Carbon Action Partnership, Political Declaration (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.icapcarbonaction.com/docs/icap_declaration.pdf.
9. E.g., S. 2191, 110th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Environment and Public
Works, Dec. 5, 2007); S. 1766, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 309, 110th
Cong. (2007); S. 317, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1177, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1168, 110th Cong.
(2007); S. 280, 110th Cong. (2007).
10. E.g., H.R. 1961, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 4226, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 620, 110th
Cong. (2007); H.R. 1590, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2069, 110th Cong. (2007).
11. See S. 2191, 110th Cong.
12. See S. 1766, 110th Cong.
13. See S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 9004.
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provision would allow state and regional carbon trading markets to
continue, provided the required emissions reductions are equal to or
greater than the federal standard. Other bills, such as the BingamanSpecter bill, are silent regarding preemption of state carbon markets.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
Developing a policy that addresses multiple regional/state carbon
markets, should a federal cap-and-trade regime come into effect,
raises a number of issues for policymakers to consider, including:
• Environmental performance – What level of GHG emissions
are necessary to prevent catastrophic climate change, what is
the appropriate timeline for achieving the reductions, and
what policies will most effectively achieve the reductions?
• Loss of state revenue – States that are participating in
regional/state carbon markets may earn income by
auctioning the allowances to covered entities. For example,
RGGI states are relying on a full or close to full auction to
14
distribute allowances.
Is it appropriate for the policy to
consider losses in state revenue and, if so, what are the
options for compensating the states?
• Implementation – How can market integration be designed
to minimize transaction costs and bureaucratic complexity?
• Fairness – What safeguards are necessary to avoid windfall
profits or penalties for companies already participating in
these markets?
• Political viability – Is it possible to integrate state, regional,
and federal carbon markets in a manner that maintains the

“(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), in accordance with section 116 of the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7416) and section 510 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33
U.S.C. 1370), nothing in this Act precludes or abrogates the right of any State to adopt or
enforce—
(1) any standard, cap, limitation, or prohibition relating to emissions of greenhouse gas; or
(2) any requirement relating to control, abatement, or avoidance of emissions of greenhouse
gas.
(b) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding subsection (a), no State may adopt a standard, cap,
limitation, prohibition, or requirement that is less stringent than the applicable standard, cap,
limitation, prohibition, or requirement under this Act.”
14. See, e.g., New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Notice of PreProposal of New York RGGI Rule: Notice of Release and Call for Comments (Dec. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/26450.html (“Principal among the New Yorkspecific provisions is the proposed 100% auction allocation method . . . .”).
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political support of government officials representing the
affected states?
Economic efficiency – How can the policy best maximize
economic efficiency and create incentives for investment and
early reductions in GHG emissions?

V. OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING
REGIONAL/STATE CARBON MARKETS IN FEDERAL LEGISLATION
From an environmental perspective, the total reduction of GHG
emissions is the most important criterion of a policy addressing
climate change. The method for achieving the reductions – either
through numerous state/regional trading programs or through a single
federal program – is insignificant for environmental quality as long as
the reductions are real and permanent and the programs do not
simply push GHG emissions to other regions with higher emissions
caps.
However, while co-existing state/regional and federal trading
markets can potentially achieve the same environmental goals as a
single federal market, a single national market offers additional
advantages. From an economic efficiency perspective, a single,
national market provides covered entities with the broadest range of
15
options for complying with a cap on GHG emissions. With greater
flexibility to seek low cost emission reductions and potentially lower
transaction costs, the overall cost of climate regulation for consumers
16
would be reduced. Additionally, if federal and state/regional
markets are to be merged, policymakers must assess how such
integration can be achieved efficiently and equitably.
The four general options for addressing regional/state carbon
markets in federal legislation are evaluated below based on these
various policy considerations. The options include:
1. Allowing federal and regional/state markets to coexist;
2. Preempting regional/state markets with no effort at
integration;
3. Allocating additional federal allowances to states with
carbon markets and permitting those states to manage the
integration; or

15. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, A U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate
Change 8 (John F. Kennedy School of Government – Harvard Univ. Research, Working Paper
No. 07-052, 2007).
16. Id.
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4. Accepting banked regional/state allowances in the federal
trading system.
As described below, the latter two options – integrating regional/state
markets, with the integration managed either by the states or by the
federal government – present more practical options from both a
political and an economic perspective. Implementing either of these
options would be complex, however, and the complexity increases the
risk that stakeholders could manipulate the system. Should federal
policymakers choose either of these routes, it would be prudent to
consider the factors, described in subsections 3 and 4 below, in order
to design a market that is fair, transparent, and politically viable.
1. Allowing federal and regional/state markets to coexist
There is precedent for federal environmental laws setting a
baseline and allowing states to enact more stringent protections.
17
18
Both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act allow states to
enact laws or regulations that exceed pollution limits established by
the federal government. As mentioned above, the Lieberman19
Warner bill currently follows this model, potentially allowing
regional/state GHG markets to coexist with the federal market
created by the bill. Allowing states to continue taking the lead in
curbing GHG emissions through multiple state-based markets may be
attractive politically and could lead to environmental benefits if the
20
states target emissions that are outside the federal cap. It is more
likely, however, that this approach would have a significant economic
impact and would result little or no cumulative environmental
benefits. First, large GHG emitters located within states that
participate in regional cap-and-trade markets would have an incentive
to relocate to states without the additional emissions limitations,
resulting in “leakage” of GHG emissions from one geographic region
21
to another.
Where leakage does not occur because large GHG
emitters remain within the state/regional market systems, the more

17.
18.
19.
20.

42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2005).
33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2005).
See S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 9004.
See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 110TH CONG., CLIMATE
CHANGE LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER: APPROPRIATE ROLES FOR DIFFERENT OF
GOVERNMENT (Comm. Print 2008) (hereinafter House Energy and Commerce Committee
White Paper), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Climate_Change/white%20paper
%20st-lcl%20roles%20final%202-22.pdf.
21. Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for
Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 60 (2007).
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stringent emission limitations would mean those companies would
22
As a result, more federal
require fewer federal allowances.
allowances would be available to other covered entities across the
nation and the nation’s overall GHG emissions would remain
unchanged despite the more stringent state programs.
Depending on how regional/state markets treat federal
allowances and vice versa, participating in two overlapping markets
simultaneously could require covered entities to pay twice for
emitting the same ton of carbon without providing additional options
for reducing the emissions. Furthermore, regional/state markets
could decide not to link with other domestic GHG markets. Limiting
trading options in this manner may inflate allowance costs by cutting
off access to a larger supply of allowances from entities outside the
geographic area that may otherwise be available.
Even if regional/state markets adopt the standard currency of the
federal allowances and simply require their firms to meet a higher
standard, compliance standards that differ across state boundaries
reduce overall economic efficiency and create incentives for
relocation. Depending on the compliance requirements for the
regional/state markets, covered entities could face higher transaction
23
costs due to multiple accounting and reporting standards. Perhaps
more significantly, a regional/state market that utilizes federal
allowances would require covered entities with high GHG emissions
to purchase more allowances than they would otherwise purchase
under the federal system alone. Retiring these extra allowances in a
state/regional market would limit the supply of allowances available
to other entities covered by the federal cap-and-trade system and
thereby increase the costs for all market participants.
Stricter regional/state standards could also distort markets by
creating arbitrary incentives based on geography, with GHG
emissions likely shifting from regions with stringent emissions caps to
24
The concept of
those with less stringent or no emissions caps.
“leakage” – shifting GHG emissions activities from regions subject to
an emissions cap to regions with no or less stringent restrictions – is a
significant concern for subfederal GHG cap-and-trade systems.
RGGI participants, for example, include states that participate in the
PJM regional electricity transmission organization – a system with

22. House Energy and Commerce Committee White Paper, supra note 20, at 11, 15.
23. Id. at 13.
24. See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 21, at 60.
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25

“significant coal-fired generation capacity.”
PJM includes three
RGGI participants (New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware), a portion
of Illinois (a signatory to the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Accord),
and five additional states that have not entered into a regional
26
With only a portion of the PJM
agreement to regulate GHGs.
generators located in states that will eventually be subject to GHG
cap-and-trade systems, emissions within PJM could easily shift to
generators in states without their own cap-and-trade systems, thereby
avoiding the higher generation costs. One organization reports that
modeling using the IPM power-sector simulation model suggests that
27
“leakage could offset 60-90% of RGGI’s emission reductions.”
2. Preempting regional/state markets with no effort at
integration
Blanket preemption would likely face opposition from state
political leaders, investors, and perhaps environmentalists. Political
leaders in these states have invested time, resources, and political
capital to forge carbon market agreements, and may see a blanket
preemption of the regional/state markets as penalizing them for their
leadership in addressing climate change.
At the same time, companies participating in regional/state
carbon markets before a federal cap-and-trade market enters into
effect will make investments to reduce their GHG emissions. Many
could accumulate banked allowances by the time the federal
government implements a carbon market, and would almost certainly
oppose a federal system that simply preempts regional/state markets
and renders those banked allowances worthless. Also, the potential
for futures markets to develop in these regional programs could result
in an additional pool of investors with monetary interests in the
regional/state allowances.
Preempting regional/state climate initiatives without provisions
to integrate the markets could result in a number of problematic
outcomes, including: a depression in the value of state-issued carbon

25. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Potential Emissions Leakage and the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI): Evaluating Market Dynamics, Monitoring Options, and
Possible Mitigation Mechanisms ES-1, ES-2 (Mar. 14, 2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/
docs/il_report_final_3_14_07.pdf.
26. See PJM, Overview, http://www.pjm.com/about/overview.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2008).
27. American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, The Magnificent Seven: States
Take the Lead on Global Warming, ACEEE’S Grapevine Online, Jan. 17, 2006,
http://www.aceee.org/about/0601rggi.htm.
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allowances as the start date of the federal program approaches;
higher costs for meeting the emissions requirements caused by stifled
trading in the final years of the regional/state market; and the
dumping of allowances on the market by investors seeking to recover
some of their costs. The European Union’s experience with the
transition from Phase I to Phase II of its Emissions Trading System
28
(EU ETS) is instructive. The EU ETS did not allow companies to
transfer banked allowances from Phase I to the current Phase II,
contributing to a dramatic drop in price in the last few months of
29
Phase I. Preempting state programs without ensuring that banked
regional/state allowances retain value could similarly discourage early
emissions reductions and market investments in state/regional
programs.
3. Allocating federal allowances to states with carbon markets
and permitting those states to manage the integration
The first option for integrating regional/state carbon markets
into a federal market relies on the states to manage the integration
process. The current version of the Lieberman-Warner bill provides
separate pools of allowances to states for various reasons. For
example, the bill sets aside two percent of each year’s allowances for
distribution to states that, prior to implementation of the federal
system, enacted GHG emission reduction programs that exceed the
30
federal standard. Similarly, one percent of the annual allowances
would be distributed among states that adopt specific energy-saving
31
policies. Another five percent of the annual emission allowances
would be allocated to states to fund a variety of policy objectives,
including mitigating the impacts on low-income energy consumers
and/or vulnerable industries, promoting energy efficiency, and
32
encouraging technology development. Following this precedent, the

28. Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) (EC).
29. LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EU EMISSIONS
TRADING SCHEME (ETS) ENTERS KYOTO COMPLIANCE PHASE 26 (2008),
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Dec/RL34150.pdf (“The combination of poor
emissions inventories, non-use of project credits, and time-limited allowances with effectively no
banking resulted in extreme price volatility in Spring 2006, and virtually worthless allowances by
mid-2007.”).
30. S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 3401 (as reported by S. Comm. on the Env’t and Pub. Works,
Dec. 5, 2007).
31. Id. at § 3402.
32. Id. at § 3303. The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee adopted an
amendment by Senator John Barasso that allows states to use their portion of this five percent
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federal climate bill could provide an additional category of
allowances to states with carbon trading markets in the final stages of
development or already in existence by either; (a) the time of
enactment of a federal climate bill (e.g. RGGI) or (b) the time the
federal program comes online (e.g. California).
This approach sets a single national cap on GHG emissions while
also providing the eligible states with the flexibility to determine
whether and how to reimburse covered entities for their unused
regional/state-issued allowances. For example, states could permit
companies to exchange their unused regional/state allowances for
federal allowances of equal value or could sell the federal allowances
in the marketplace and offer to buy unused regional/state allowances.
This approach also allows states earning income by auctioning
regional/state allowances to sell a portion of the federal allowances on
the market to replace the lost auction revenue. Finally, permitting
states to manage the integration of their markets with a federal
market could provide a solution to the question of how to address
banked offset credits generated through regional/state markets, an
issue that, as discussed in Section VI below, could prove difficult if
managed on the federal level.
The approach is not without tradeoffs. At least 23 states have
pledged to develop and participate in RGGI, WCI, or the Midwest
33
Greenhouse Gas Accord, and the number of states that would be
eligible for compensation continues to grow as new markets are
proposed (e.g. the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord announced on
34
November 15, 2007 ) and new states sign onto existing carbon market
initiatives (e.g. Montana announcing on November 19, 2007 that it
35
would join the WCI ). RGGI is scheduled to begin allowance
trading in 2009, and the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord states that
signatories will “develop a market-based and multi-sector cap-andof allowances to fund any other purpose necessary to mitigate negative economic impacts of
global warming or the Act. Id. at § 3303(1)(L).
33. E.g., Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship Summit, Midwestern
Greenhouse
Gas
Accord,
Midwestern
Governors
Ass’n
(2007),
http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/resolutions/GHGAccord.pdf; Midwestern Governors
Ass’n, Governors Sign Energy Security and Climate Stewardship Platform and Greenhouse Gas
Accord., http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/govenergynov.htm; Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, http://rggi.org/about.htm.
34. Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship Summit, supra note 33.
35. Montana announced on November 19, 2007 that it would become the seventh U.S.
state to join the WCI. Sarah Elliott, Governor Announces New 20X10 Initiative – State to Lead
by Example, Accepts Climate Change Report and Joins Western Climate Initiative, Montana’s
Official State Website, Nov. 19, 2007, http://governor.mt.gov/news/pr.asp?ID=513.
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36

trade mechanism within 30 months” (by May 15, 2010). WCI has
yet to announce its implementation date, but it is possible that all
three regional carbon markets could come on-line by the time a
37
federal policy would likely be effective.
States participating in these markets would have an incentive to
begin trading prior to the implementation date for the federal policy
to justify their claim on a portion of the additional allowances. If the
portion of federal allowances allocated to states for this purpose is
conditioned on the number of banked regional/state allowances that
exist prior to the federal program’s implementation, there could be a
strong push by states working on the WCI or the Midwest
Greenhouse Accord to design their systems in a manner that would
generate a higher number of allowances than would otherwise exist.
Other states that are not participating in GHG market development
would also have an incentive to create their own markets quickly to
ensure that they get a portion of the additional allowances.
Allocating sufficient emission allowances to each of these states
could restrict the number of allowances available to fund other
objectives such as offsetting increased energy costs for low-income
citizens, promoting carbon capture and storage technologies,
investing in international forest protection, revenue recycling to offset
38
Furthermore, a decentralized
other discretionary taxes, etc.
approach may create advantages for firms in particular states. For
example, New York and Connecticut could decide on different
approaches to compensating utilities covered by RGGI, creating a
potential advantage for companies in one of the states.
To address the concern that there may not be enough federal
allowances to compensate firms for banked regional/state allowances,
federal policymakers could limit allocations to the states based on the
actual number of allowances that are banked when the federal market
becomes effective. If policymakers determine that the number of
allowances should also be sufficient to reimburse states for some or
36. Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship Summit, supra note 33.
37. For example, the Lieberman-Warner bill would become effective in 2012. S. 2191,
110th Cong. § 1201(a) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Env’t and Pub. Works, Dec. 5, 2007).
38. See, e.g., id at § 3401, 3403(b)(1) (allocating allowances to load-serving entities to
“mitigate the economic impacts on low- and middle-income energy consumers, including by
reducing transmission charges or issuing rebates” and to promote energy efficiency); id. at §
3601 (allocating four percent of annual allowances for years 2012-2030 to promote development
of carbon capture and storage technologies); id. at § 3801-3806 (allocating “2.5 percent of
allowances for use in carrying out forest carbon activities in countries other than the United
States.”).
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all of the lost income from allowance auctions, the number of
allowances could be increased accordingly. The allowances given to
the states for this purpose could also be rationed over a number of
years if the number of required allowances is too high to allocate in
one year, eventually achieving a one-to-one ratio between the banked
state allowances and the allocated federal allowances.
4. Accepting regional/state allowances in the federal trading
system
A second option for integrating regional/state carbon markets
would preempt state markets when the federal market becomes
effective, yet allow entities with banked regional/state carbon
allowances to use them in the federal market. Under RGGI and the
Lieberman-Warner bill, covered entities can comply with their
emissions caps by reducing their own emissions, purchasing
allowances from other companies subject to the emissions cap, or
purchasing offset credits from entities that are not subject to the
39
emissions cap. Assuming that allowances for direct emissions in all
of the affected markets represent the equivalent of a ton of carbon
40
dioxide, reductions in carbon emissions under any program are
equivalent to reductions under any other program, even if total
41
emission reductions and price per ton may vary.
This approach maintains administrative simplicity on the federal
level and maintains stable regional/state markets until the federal
program begins. In addition, certainty that banked regional/state
allowances would retain value in the federal system could provide an
incentive for companies to invest in early emission reductions. While
accepting regional/state allowances into the federal system could lead
39. RGGI, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule, Jan. 5, 2007, XX-7, XX-10,
http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_corrected_1_5_07.pdf; see also, S. 2191, 110th Cong. §§
1202, 2101.
40. The RGGI market will use the measurement of short tons, while proposals for federal
legislation and the EU Emission Trading System use metric tons. Should policymakers choose
this option, it may be necessary to translate RGGI credits to metric ton equivalents. One metric
ton is equal to 1,000 kilograms, or 2,204.6 pounds, whereas the U.S. measurement of a short ton
equals 2,000 pounds, http://www.metric-conversions.org/weight/short-tons-to-metric-tons.htm.
41. For example, RGGI allowance prices are projected to reach about $3.00/ton in 2015,
while credits based on a proposal outlined by Senators Lieberman and Warner in August, 2007,
were projected to reach $18 in the same year. New York Dept. of Envt’l. Conservation, Job
Impact Statement 6 NYCRR Part 242, CO2 Budget Trading Program, available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/regulations/39140.html; Brian C. Murray & Martin T. Ross, The
Lieberman-Warner America’s Climate Security Act: A Preliminary Assessment of Potential
Economic Impacts, Oct. 2007, at 5, Duke University and RTI International, available at
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/econsummary.pdf.
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to extra allowances in the first years of the federal market, it should
not lead to a net increase in atmospheric GHG concentrations if all
state programs are designed well. Because carbon dioxide released
today will remain in the atmosphere for approximately a century, a
ton of carbon dioxide will lead to the same increase in overall
atmospheric concentrations whether it is released in 2011 under a
42
Accepting
regional cap or in 2012 under a federal cap.
regional/state allowances would simply allow companies with banked
allowances to choose between using allowances in the regional/state
market prior to the federal market, or after the federal market comes
online.
One concern with accepting regional/state allowances in a federal
market is that any major failures of state/regional programs could be
carried over to a federal program. For example, a recent analysis by
Point Carbon suggests that the RGGI emissions cap may exceed
actual emissions through 2012, “allowing for the build-up of a
43
significant emissions bank.” The report projects that the bank of
over-allocated allowances “would not be depleted until the cap begins
44
to decrease in 2015.” Over-allocation could be a particular concern,
as accepting regional/state allowances into a federal market could
create perverse incentives for states to over-allocate credits,
particularly those taking action relatively close to the effective date of
the federal program.
If an over-allocated regional/state cap were not resolved before
implementation of a federal market (i.e. a regional/state program
does not result in total reductions greater than the emissions
represented by banked allowances), then the companies holding
banked allowances would have the advantage of continuing to emit
the same level of GHGs while also saving low-cost emissions
allowances for use in the federal market. This would result in both a
fairness issue and more GHG emissions on balance than prescribed
by the regional/state and federal caps.
The differing regional/state caps raise a similar concern –
companies operating in markets with less stringent caps could enjoy a
competitive advantage over those subject to more stringent caps. For

42. Lydia Olander et al., Climate Change Science: What We Know, Nicholas Inst. for Envtl.
Policy Solutions, Duke University, Mar. 2007, at 2, available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/
institute/climatchangesummary.pdf.
43. Press Release, Point Carbon Research, Emissions Trading in the U.S.: Is RGGI OverAllocated?, (Aug. 17, 2007), 10-11 (on file with author).
44. Id.
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example, Company A, operating in a region with a less stringent cap,
and Company B, operating in a region with a more stringent cap,
could make equal reductions in their GHG emissions. Whereas the
reductions may be enough for Company B to comply with the
region’s emissions cap, Company A’s emissions reductions could lead
to a large number of banked allowances because fewer allowances are
required to comply with the less stringent cap. The ability to use
banked allowances in a federal cap-and-trade system could lead to
pressure on state lawmakers to enact less stringent emissions caps in
order to provide a long-term economic advantage for companies
under their jurisdiction.
Additionally, accepting regional/state allowances could suppress
the initial value of federal emission allowances if a significant number
of regional/state allowances were available due to over-allocated
regional/state programs or greater reductions in GHG emissions than
expected. Depending on a stakeholder’s interests, suppressed prices
in the federal market could be seen as a positive or a negative –
companies may face less of a financial burden as they adjust to a
carbon market, yet a higher number of available allowances, and thus
a higher cap on GHG emissions, could delay investments aimed at
emissions reductions.
If any of the concerns described above become points of
contention, either from an environmental or economic perspective,
policymakers could grant to the EPA Administrator the authority to
discount the value of a state-generated allowance (i.e., counting a
state-generated allowance as half of a federal allowance, or another
appropriate number).
VI. CREDITS GENERATED THROUGH OFFSET PROJECTS
Early emissions reductions achieved through offset projects
present additional challenges for integrating federal and
state/regional GHG markets. In order to represent a valid, long-term
reduction in GHG emissions, mechanisms must be in place to
measure and verify the offset projects. Regulators designing a federal
offsets program must determine the types of projects that are eligible
for participation in the program, as well the mechanisms for verifying
that: (a) the offsets represent additional reductions in GHG emissions
rather than reductions that would have occurred without the offset
program; (b) the projects do not create “leakage” – shifting the
emissions from one emitter to another rather than achieving a
reduction in overall emissions; and (c) there are adequate safeguards
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to account for eventual release or reversal – a particular concern
45
when offset projects depend on storing GHGs in plants or soils.
Federal regulators could face significant challenges with verifying
numerous regional/state offset projects based on differing standards
and verification measures.
Additionally, while the allowances available in a cap-and-trade
system are limited by the cap placed on total GHG emissions, banked
offset credits (credits purchased from entities not covered by the
GHG emission cap and banked for future use) have to qualify as
offsets under the legislation but are not ultimately limited in
46
number. Although RGGI analysts predict low demand for offset
projects in the first three years of the market – only 0.6 million short
47
tons out of a total emissions cap of 188 million short tons – the
supply of credits in the private, voluntary GHG markets is large and
growing. In just five years, the Chicago Climate Exchange has issued
credits for over 20 million metric tons (or nearly 23 million short
48
tons).
Participants in regional/state GHG markets may be more
likely to tap into this already booming offset market if banked offsets
were transferable to an emerging federal market. Regulators
determining how to address banked offset credits in regional/state
markets could decide to subject all banked offset credits – from
regional/state markets and voluntary markets – to the same
verification criteria in order to transfer into a federal market.

45. Climate Change Policy Partnership, Harnessing Farms and Forests: Domestic
Greenhouse Gas Offsets for a Federal Cap and Trade Policy FAQs, Duke University Ctr. on
Global Change, http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/ccpp/harnessingfaqs.pdf.
46. Legislation may limit the total number offset credits that a covered entity may use to
comply with its emissions cap. For example, the Lieberman-Warner Bill allows capped entities
to “satisfy up to fifteen percent of the total allowance submission requirement . . . by submitting
offset allowances.”. S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 2402(a). If GHG markets allow unrestricted
banking of offset credits, however, the total number of offset credits available for purchase
would be limited by the scope of projects that qualify under the definition of an offset and the
number of offset providers selling the credits rather than the amount of GHG emissions that
could be sequestered in trees and soil and/or achieved through companies that are not subject to
a federal emissions. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for example, estimates that
the total GHG mitigation potential from the domestic forest and agriculture sectors alone could
be as high as 655 terragrams (or 655 million metric tons) of carbon dioxide per year by 2025.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION POTENTIAL IN
U.S. FORESTRY AND AGRICULTURE ES-2 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/
sequestration/pdf/ghg_part2.pdf.
47. RGGI, Evaluation of Offsets Supply and Potential Demand, May 1, 2006,
http://www.rggi.org/docs/offsets_supply_5_1_06.pdf.
48. Chicago Climate Exchange, CCX Registry Offsets Report, December 13,
2007,http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/offsets/projectReport.jsf.
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49

Given the difficulties of verifying actual reductions and the
potential for offset credits to flood the market in its early years,
federal regulators could choose to exclude banked offset credits from
the federal market. If policymakers adopted options V(3) or V(4)
described above, the impacts of excluding banked offsets on the state
and regional markets would be limited by the fact that covered
entities could use credits from offsets to meet their obligations in the
regional/state markets and bank any remaining regular allowances for
use in the federal market.
On the other hand, a decision to accept banked offset credits in
the federal system could lead to increased investment in
regional/state-based offset projects and early emissions reductions
from unregulated entities, generating income for and support from
landowners, farmers, and small emitters, and allowing federal
regulators to evaluate the effectiveness of offset projects while
creating the federal rules for offset projects. If policymakers choose
to integrate banked offset credits into the federal GHG market, they
will need to establish clear standards that a state and regional offset
verification program must meet. While the EPA could define the
federal offsets protocol, federal legislation could place the burden on
state/regional regulators or the owners of the banked offset credits to
provide independent verification of compliance with the federal
criteria.
A federal cap-and-trade system could accept verified, banked
offset credits using an approach similar to those described above –
allocating allowances to states and permitting the states to distribute
the federal allowances to owners of banked offset credits or allowing
the owner of banked offset credits to use the credits directly in the
federal market. Federal legislation could address concerns about a
large number of offset credits flooding the market by allowing
regulators to discount the credits or limit the number of offset credits
that may enter the market in any given year.

49. Regulators will need to verify that an offsets project (a) results in an overall reduction
in GHG emissions (i.e., a tree plantation that would exist with or without a cap-and-trade
market would not lead to additional reductions), (b) avoids leakage, and (c) accounts for the
risk of release or reversal (e.g., a hurricane blowing trees down). Olander, supra note 42, at 4;
see generally, Michael Gillenwater, et al., Policing the Voluntary Carbon Market, Nature, Oct.
11, 2007, http://www.nature.com/climate/2007/0711/full/climate.2007.58.html.
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VII. CREDIT FOR EARLY ACTION
Both the Lieberman-Warner bill and RGGI provide allowances
for companies that take action to reduce their GHG emissions prior
to implementation of the markets. The Lieberman-Warner bill, for
example, provides allowances during the first five years of the federal
market to reward firms for verified emissions reductions from 1994
50
until the implementation of the federal market.
Similarly, the
RGGI Model Rule establishes a utility’s emissions baseline using
emissions data from 2003-2005, and creates “early reduction CO2
allowances” for utilities whose emissions are lower than their baseline
51
level between 2006 and 2008.
The different dates for determining baselines and the different
methodologies for verifying early emission reductions create the
distinct possibility that early actors could receive multiple allowances
52
for the same emission reduction. If a company received allowances
for early action from regional/state markets and those markets were
integrated into the federal system, it would not be equitable to
provide an equal number of allowances for early action at both
regulatory levels. Companies operating in states without mandatory
GHG cap-and-trade systems could find themselves at a competitive
disadvantage. On the other hand, state and federal regulators may
not provide the same level of credit for early actions, suggesting that a
blanket approach that excludes companies from receiving federal
credit if they have also received state-based credit could result in
inadequate compensation compared to companies in unregulated
states.
A federal law could avoid both of these inequitable results by
granting regulators the flexibility to adjust allocation to individual
early actors, with the goal of treating early actors equally. If the
regional/state market has already provided some credit, the federal
regulators could provide additional allowances as necessary to ensure
that those companies receive the same level of credit as those
companies operating in unregulated states. On the other hand,
regulators could withhold allowances from companies receiving the

50. S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 3301.
51. RGGI, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule, January 5, 2007, XX-5.3(c),
http://www.rggi.org/docs/model_rule_corrected_1_5_07.pdf.
52. WCI and the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord have not specified how they will
address early actors.
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same level of early action credit in the regional/state market as they
would have under the federal market.
VIII. CONCLUSION
At least one of the three regional/state carbon markets currently
under development – RGGI – is scheduled to go into effect well
before the Lieberman-Warner or Bingaman-Specter bills’ effective
53
date of 2012, and another – the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord –
54
will at least be developed if not fully implemented. There is reason
to believe that the third, WCI, will also be in effect by 2012, as that is
the deadline by which California law requires that state to begin
55
achieving emissions reductions. A federal climate policy will need
to specify whether these markets can continue operating after a
national climate regime is in place, and what, if anything, will happen
to unused regional/state emissions allowances. A plan to integrate
the regional markets presents a compromise between outright
preemption and subjecting companies to the inefficiencies of
multiple, overlapping cap-and-trade programs.
With proper
forethought, policymakers could design a federal market that creates
a level playing field, rewards states for taking the lead, rewards
companies who have taken early action, and, at the same time, does
not put companies operating in states without carbon markets at a
disadvantage.

53. S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 1201(a).
54. Midwestern Energy Security & Climate Stewardship Summit, Midwestern Greenhouse
Gas Accord, Midwestern Governors Ass’n 4 (2007), http://www.midwesterngovernors.org/
resolutions/GHGAccord.pdf.
55. Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat., § 38562.

